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I. Introduction
A car careens down the street, engine smoking, windows
smashed. The driver, perhaps realizing that he cannot regain control,
jumps out, rolling to relative safety. The car, left unmanned, jumps a
curb and lands on a sidewalk filled with pedestrians. As the car
continues to wreak havoc on the sidewalk, leaving a trail of injured
pedestrians in its wake, the erstwhile driver stands up, brushes himself
off, and walks into a nearby bar. He quickly enters into conversations
with a variety of underworld characters: gangsters, criminals, and
even prostitutes. When he leaves the bar, he walks up to a car
stopped at a red light, brandishes a gun, steals the car, and drives off
into the sunset.
The scene described above, or some similar variation, can be
found in any of the infamous Grand Theft Auto series of video games
produced by Rockstar Games (“Rockstar”). The Guinness Book of
World Records named the series the “most controversial” video game
in history in both 2008 and 2009; also in 2008, the fourth game in the
series, Grand Theft Auto IV, held the records for the Highest
Grossing Video Game in 24 Hours and the Highest Revenue
1
Generated by an Entertainment Product in 24 Hours. Rockstar has
continued to release games in the series; the most recent, Grand Theft
Auto: The Ballad of Gay Tony, was released on October 29, 2009.
Each version of the game has been more technologically advanced
than the previous version, and the graphics have been increasingly
realistic. Rockstar’s history of pressing the boundaries of game
development, as well as its tendency to stir up controversy, leads to a
simple question: what next?
Imagine, if you will, that the characters in the underworld bar
described at the beginning of this paper had the faces of people you
know. What if Rockstar decided to use the face of a well-known
celebrity as the obvious model for one of the gangsters? What if they
used a vivid animation of a celebrity as a model for one of the
prostitutes? Would that celebrity have a legal right to prevent the
game from being released, or to require Rockstar to edit the game?
The answers to these questions are not as clear as might be
expected—a troubling situation in a world where technological
advances outstrip the development of the law by a significant margin.

1. GUINNESS WORLD RECORDS 2009: GAMER’S EDITION 108–09 (Craig Glenday
ed., 2009); GUINNESS WORLD RECORDS 2009, 307 (Craig Glenday ed., 2009).
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Recent developments in digital imaging technology have allowed
video game publishers to create ever more realistic looking games.
Many game players seek out the higher level of authenticity that this
realism allows, encouraging producers in turn to continue to work at
improving the technology. The upsides to improved digital imagery
are dramatically realistic scenery, movement, and of course,
characters like the ones described above. The downside, however, is
that it is now plausible to envision a scenario in which a celebrity
might see her literal face being used in a game without her consent, in
a situation that she does not endorse. This possibility was troubling
when game images were highly pixilated and thus virtually
unrecognizable; how much more troubling, then, is it now, when faces
are rendered in stunning accuracy? And what legal remedies, if any,
exist to protect that celebrity?
Part II of this paper will review the legal rights and remedies
currently available to a celebrity whose face or image was used by a
2
game developer without the celebrity’s consent. Part III of this
paper will then consider whether the current regime provides
sufficient protection to celebrities who seek to prevent misuse of their
images. Part IV of this paper will then turn to other sources of law
and consider whether an alternative scheme, such as a moral rights
system based on the European model, would be more appropriate.
Finally, Part V of this paper will conclude that a federal right of
publicity is necessary and will consider what such a statute would
need to address.

II. The Current Legal Options
The most common legal claim made by a celebrity seeking to
challenge an unauthorized use of her image is a right of publicity
claim. The right of publicity is purely state-based and can be either
3
statutory or developed through common law. It is often referred to

2. Many of the same issues also arise in the context of user-generated content and
non-celebrity images. However, the rights implicated are somewhat different and are
beyond the scope of this paper.
3. As of this writing, fifteen states have codified rights of publicity, while sixteen
more have a comparable common law right. ROBERT PETER MERGES ET AL.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 1020 (5th ed. 2010).
Some states, such as California, have both: Cal. Civ. Code section 3344 provides a
statutory right, while courts have recognized a broader common law right as well. See,
e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979) (holding that a common law
right of publicity existed in California and complemented the statutory right). Other
writers have placed the numbers significantly higher. See, e.g., Barbara A. Solomon, Can
the Lanham Act Protect Tiger Woods? An Analysis of Whether the Lanham Act is a Proper
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as an off-shoot of misappropriation, one of the four traditional
4
invasion of privacy torts first described by William Prosser in 1960,
though that is not an entirely accurate description of the current legal
landscape, as will be discussed below.
Celebrities can also make a more traditional invasion of privacy
claim, such as general misappropriation, publication of private
5
information, or false light. These claims, however, are often difficult
6
for celebrities to prove, due to their status as public figures. Both the
traditional invasion of privacy torts and the right of publicity are
7
sometimes referred to under the general name of a right to privacy.
In addition to these common law torts, many states have statutory or
8
constitutional rights to privacy. However, the right to privacy has a
complex and often confusing history in American jurisprudence that
can make a celebrity’s claim particularly challenging and the outcome
9
difficult to anticipate.
In addition to the various invasion of privacy claims, a celebrity
10
can also bring a claim for unfair competition or false endorsement.
The former can be brought under either state or federal laws, while

Substitute for a Federal Right of Publicity, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1202, 1205 (Nov.–Dec.
2004) (“Some version of the right of publicity is recognized in 42 states; by statute in 18
states and by common law in 35 states (of which 11 also have statutes).”).
4. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (describing the
four invasion of privacy torts); id. at 406–07 (describing the right of publicity as a version
of the tort of misappropriation). Prosser’s characterization of the right of publicity as a
form of misappropriation has since been adopted by many courts; see, e.g., KNB
Enterprises v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); but see J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, 1 Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 1:3 (2d ed.) (“The right of publicity is a
state-law created intellectual property right whose infringement is a commercial tort of
unfair competition. It is a distinct legal category, not just a “kind of” trademark, copyright,
false advertising or right of privacy. While it bears some family resemblances to all these
neighboring areas of the law, the right of publicity has its own unique legal dimensions and
reasons for being.”).
5. The fourth invasion of privacy tort, publication of private information, is less
relevant to these claims and is not typically alleged in cases such as those being discussed
here.
6. See, e.g., Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 249–50 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
higher “actual malice” standard articulated by the Supreme Court in New York v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in the context of alleged defamation of a public figure
applied equally to invasion of privacy claims involving public figures).
7. See Prosser, supra note 4, at 389.
8. See, e.g., CAL. CONST., art. I, § 1.
9. See generally ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY (1995).
10. See, e.g., Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); see
also Brown v. Elec. Arts, No. 2:09-cv-01598-FMC-RZx (C.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2009), appeal
docketed, No. 09-56675 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2009).
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the latter is typically raised under federal trademark law, codified in
the Lanham Act at 15 U.S.C. § 1125. A Lanham Act claim may seem
appealing because it allows a plaintiff to invoke a clearly defined
federal statute; however, relying on trademark or competition law to
enforce what is essentially a privacy claim has its own dangers, as will
be discussed below.
On occasion, celebrities have also made other claims such as
11
copyright infringement. However, the requirement that a creation
be “fixed in a tangible medium” generally makes a copyright claim
12
Although where the copyright claim is
more difficult to prove.
based on misappropriation of a tangible work, such as a photograph
13
or film, some celebrities have been more successful.
A. The Right of Publicity

The right of publicity is defined by J. Thomas McCarthy as “the
inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of
14
his or her identity.” Under this definition, the right of publicity can
only be used to prevent someone else from improperly profiting from
a celebrity’s image, thereby preventing the celebrity from exploiting
his or her own image in that context—it does not prohibit mere
reputational harm. This definition has been accepted by most courts
and explicitly incorporated into many of the right of publicity
15
statutes.

11. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that a
performer had a right to damages after a new reporter broadcast an unauthorized
recording of the performer’s act and the performer brought a claim alleging a “cause of
action for conversion and for infringement of a common-law copyright.”).
12. Cf. KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that a right of publicity claim based on misappropriation of a photograph was not
pre-empted by the Copyright Act based on Nimmer’s assertion that “[a] persona can
hardly be said to constitute a ‘writing’ of an ‘author’ within the meaning of the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution.” 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (1999) § 1.01[B][1][c], 1-22–1-23
(footnotes omitted).
13. See, e.g., Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (finding a
probability of success on Browne’s right of publicity claim and a lack of First Amendment
protection where Browne also claimed copyright infringement due to McCain’s use of
Browne’s music in a political campaign commercial).
14. See MCCARTHY, supra note 4 at § 1:3.
15. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2011) (statutory right of publicity only
applies to uses for the “purposes of advertising or selling”) (emphasis added); see also Jim
Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 175, 188 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (“The right to publicity protects that value as property, and its infringement is a
commercial, rather than a personal tort.”). The Supreme Court also appears to subscribe
to this definition; see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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In California, to prevail on a statutory right to publicity claim, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her “name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness” was used “on or in products, merchandise,
or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting
purchases of products, merchandise, goods or services, without such
16
person’s prior consent.”
While the precise standard for
demonstrating a right of publicity varies somewhat in other states, a
requirement that the use be commercial and involve the unauthorized
17
use of the individual’s “likeness” is typical.
The term “likeness” does not appear in every state’s right of
publicity laws, but where it does, courts have often struggled to
18
determine precisely what the term encompasses. California courts
have differentiated between the statutory right of publicity, which
involves misappropriation of “another’s name, voice, signature,
19
photograph, or likeness” and the common law right of publicity,
which the Ninth Circuit applies when a “celebrity’s identity is
commercially exploited . . . whether or not his ‘name or likeness’ is
20
used.” Federal courts both within California and elsewhere have
21
held that the right of publicity therefore protects a celebrity’s voice,
22
23
signature introduction, and even general “identity” as well as his or
24
her name and image. Based on courts’ willingness to expand the
right of publicity to encompass a wide variety of uses, it seems safe to

16. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2011).
17. See, e.g., Pennsylvania: 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8316(a) (“Any natural person
whose name or likeness has commercial value and is used for any commercial or
advertising purpose without the written consent . . . ”); Florida: FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (2011)
(“No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for purposes of trade or
for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, photograph, or other
likeness of any natural person . . . ”); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170(2) (West
2011) (“The name or likeness of a person who is a public figure shall not be used for
commercial profit . . . ” ) (all emphasis added).
18. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2011).
20. White v. Samsung Elecs., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1987)).
21. Id.
22. Carson, 698 F.2d 831.
23. White, 971 F.2d 1395.
24. See, e.g., Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding
that a model’s right of publicity claim based on L’Oreal’s alleged misuse of the model’s
image as captured in photographs was protected by the Illinois right of publicity statute
and not preempted by federal copyright law).
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assume that a strikingly realistic rendering of a celebrity’s face, used
25
in a videogame, will be accepted as a protected category.
These state rights, whether statutory or common law, are the only
protections explicitly designed to protect an individual’s image, voice,
26
persona, or identity from misappropriation. Unfortunately, because
they are state-based and often case law-based, they tend to vary
27
dramatically by state and sometimes even by court. This disparity in
protection encourages forum shopping and makes predicting the
28
outcome in any given case extremely difficult. Moreover, because
these cases are often based in state laws, litigants are forced to
address issues of federal preemption and limited jurisdiction when
29
they bring suit in federal courts.
The common law nature of these rights in some states means that
there is no explicit explanation of legislative intent in many cases,
leaving courts to divine the core goal of the law or previous holding.
The consensus today appears to be that the right of publicity is
primarily intended to ensure that celebrities, and to a lesser extent
private individuals, are able to profit economically from the
30
exploitation of their images.
The logical consequence of this
reasoning is that while an individual might be able to block the use of
his or her image due to a financial misappropriation claim, a claim
based on a purely moral or reputational argument would be unlikely
31
to succeed. The reasons for this situation can be found in the origins
of the right itself.

25. This is, in fact, proven to be the case in the cases decided on this subject thus far:
see, e.g., Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 612-14, (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(comparing a singer’s celebrity appearance to the video game character that the singer
alleged to be a misappropriation of her likeness; although the court dismissed the singer’s
claim, it accepted the character as a potential likeness).
26. Although the Lanham Act is used to achieve a similar end, that is not its stated
purpose. Solomon, supra note 3, at 1212. (“There is no mention of a person’s likeness in
the statute. There is no indication that commercial appropriation of a likeness itself is
actionable.”).
27. Id. at 1203–04.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Burnett v. Fox, 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 974 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (dismissing
Burnett’s copyright and trademark claims and declining to exercise jurisdiction over her
state right claims); see also Brown v. Elec. Arts, No. 2:09-cv-01598-FMC-RZx (C.D. Cal.
Sep. 23, 2009) (dismissing Brown’s Lanham Act claim and declining to extend jurisdiction
to his state claims), appeal docketed, No. 09-56675 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2009) .
30. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807 (Cal.
2001) (“The necessary implication . . . is that the right of publicity is essentially an
economic right.”).
31. See id.
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The History of the Right of Publicity

In order to understand the right of publicity as it exists today, it is
first necessary to consider its origins. Much of the difficulty
experienced by courts today stems from the fact that the right of
publicity has something of a dual nature. It developed to complement
the right to privacy, yet many modern courts categorize it as a
32
property right.
Courts have only recognized the existence of a right of publicity,
sometimes called the right of celebrity, for just over fifty years. Judge
Frank of the Second Circuit coined the phrase “right of publicity” in
33
Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum.
Haelan addressed
whether a baseball player had “the right to grant the exclusive
34
privilege of publishing his picture . . ..” In holding that the player
did have such a right, Judge Frank first differentiated this right from a
more general right to privacy, which he characterized as “a personal
and non-assignable right not to have his feelings hurt by such a
35
publication.” Given the baseball player’s celebrity status, the goal of
the lawsuit was not simply to prevent publication of the player’s
likeness but rather to control, and thus financially exploit, that
36
publication. Judge Frank held that the player did indeed have that
37
right, which he called a “right of publicity.” However, Judge Frank
was careful not to specify whether this new “right of publicity”
qualified as a true property right, noting that the question was
38
unnecessary to his decision.
Over time, the majority of courts and commentators have
determined that a right of publicity is essentially a property right
designed to deal with commercial misappropriation and nothing
39
else. Others, however, have continued to see the right of publicity as
an offshoot of the right to privacy with the potential for wider
40
application. This divide underscores a serious dichotomy in right of
publicity law: not only are the available remedies different, depending
on the nature of the violation, but the very concepts inherent in the

32. MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 1020.
33. Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
40. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS § 50 (McKinney 2009) (called the right to privacy but
encompassing the court-recognized right of publicity).

2011]

ALL YOUR FACE ARE BELONG TO US

101

right, and thus their potential scope, are also different. Many courts,
however, would probably agree with the following delineation:
The privacy-based action is designed for individuals who have
not placed themselves in the public eye. It shields such people
from the embarrassment of having their faces plastered on
billboards and cereal boxes without their permission. The
interests protected are dignity and peace of mind, and
damages are measured in terms of emotional distress. By
contrast, a right of publicity action is designed for individuals
who have placed themselves in the public eye. It secures for
them the exclusive right to exploit the commercial value that
attaches to their identities by virtue of their celebrity. The
right to publicity protects that value as property, and its
infringement is a commercial, rather than a personal tort.
Damages stem not from embarrassment but from the
41
unauthorized use of the plaintiffs’ property.
B. Major Right of Publicity Case Law
1.

Midler v. Ford Motor Company (9th Cir. 1988)

Bette Midler brought claims under California Civil Code section
3344 (“section 3344”) and common law right of publicity against Ford
Motors after discovering that Ford had produced a commercial using
one of Midler’s famous songs performed by a vocal imitator. The
Ninth Circuit dismissed Midler’s section 3344 claims but allowed her
to go to trial on her common law right of publicity claims, based on
the highly distinctive nature of Midler’s voice and Ford’s deliberate
42
imitation of it. The court reasoned that although Ford had not used
Midler’s “likeness” in a more traditional sense, it had intentionally
exploited her well-known and recognizable sound in a commercial
43
Midler’s voice was considered recognizable enough to
context.
potentially confuse consumers regarding her involvement in the
commercial, making her “sound” as well as her voice a key part of her
44
protectable celebrity identity.

41. Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 175, 188
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
42. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
43. Id. (In fact, the court explicitly stated that Ford had not used Midler’s likeness:
“The term ‘likeness’ refers to a visual image not a vocal imitation.”).
44. Midler actually presented evidence that some people at least had mistakenly
believed that she was the singer featured in the commercial. See id. at 461–62.
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White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (9th Cir. 1992)
45

In many ways White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
represents the high-water mark of celebrity right of publicity
protection. In an oft-criticized decision, Judge Goodwin of the Ninth
Circuit held that Vanna White had a right of publicity claim against
Samsung for the latter’s use of a robot modeled after White in a
46
televised commercial. White alleged three separate claims: a federal
Lanham Act claim, a California Civil Code statutory right of publicity
claim (“section 3344”), and a California common law right of
47
Although the Ninth Circuit dismissed White’s
publicity claim.
48
section 3344 claim, it upheld her right to proceed to trial on both her
49
50
Lanham Act and common law right of publicity claims.
One of the interesting aspects of both Midler and White is that
while section 3344 is simply a codified right of publicity, those claims
were dismissed but Midler and White’s common law claims on the
51
same subject were accepted. The White court, relying on its earlier
decision in Midler, held that section 3344 only protected an
52
individual’s “likeness” in a fairly literal sense. Because Samsung had
used a robot dressed to resemble White, as opposed to an image of
53
her face, White did not qualify for section 3344 protection.
However, just as in Midler, White’s common law right of publicity
54
claim was allowed to go before a jury. The Ninth Circuit held that
White’s typical attire and pose, mimicked in Samsung’s ad, were
iconic enough to constitute misappropriation when used without her
55
The court distinguished White’s claim from the
permission.
unauthorized use of photographs at issue in Eastwood v. Superior
56
Court, which the district court had relied on to dismiss White’s
claim. In Eastwood, the court required four elements in order to
plead a common law right of publicity claim: “(1) the defendant’s use
45. White v. Samsung Elec., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
46. Id. at 1402.
47. Id. at 1397–98.
48. Id. at 1397.
49. Id. at 1401.
50. Id. at 1399.
51. White, 971 F.2d at 1397–98; Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir.
1988).
52. See White, 971 F.2d at 1397 (“[T]he robot at issue here was not White’s “likeness”
within the meaning of section 3344.”).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1399.
55. Id.
56. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or
likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3)
57
lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.” The critical part of the
White court’s analysis held that, although misappropriation of a
celebrity’s name or likeness would clearly constitute a violation of
that celebrity’s right of publicity, “the common law right of publicity
58
is not so confined.”
b. Brown v. Electronic Arts (C.D. Cal., 2009)

On the other end of the protection spectrum is the currently
pending case involving Jim Brown, the former football player and
59
actor, and Electronic Arts (“EA”), the video game publisher.
Brown brought suit against EA, alleging that EA had used Brown’s
image and general identity in creating one of the unnamed players in
the most recent installment of the Madden Football video game
60
franchise. Like White, Brown asserted claims under the Lanham
Act, the California Civil Code, and the California common law right
61
of publicity. Unlike White, however, Brown was unsuccessful—his
Lanham Act claim was dismissed, leaving the federal district court
62
free to decline to extend jurisdiction over the state court claims. The
court reasoned that even though a consumer might well recognize
that one of the unnamed characters in the game was intended to
represent Brown, that recognition would not necessarily imply
endorsement, a key factor in alleging a Lanham Act false
63
endorsement violation. The court also noted that important First
Amendment rights were implicated, due to the creative nature of the
64
video game. Once the sole federal claim was dismissed, the court
declined to consider the state claims, dismissing them without
65
prejudice and leaving Brown to pursue them in another venue.
Brown has since appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth
66
Circuit.
57. White, 971 F.2d at 1397 (quoting Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. At 346-47).
58. Id.
59. Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 2:09cv01598 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2009), appeal
docketed, No. 09-56675 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2009).
60. Id. at 3.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 9–10.
63. Id. at 9.
64. Id. at 7–8.
65. Id. at 10.
66. Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 2:09cv01598 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2009), appeal
docketed, No. 09-56675 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2009).
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67

Keller v. Electronic Arts (N.D. Cal., 2010)

Jim Brown is not the only athlete to challenge the unauthorized
68
use of his image in a video game. Sam Keller, a former Arizona
State University and University of Nebraska football player, filed a
69
His complaint
class action lawsuit against EA Sports in 2009.
alleged violations of California’s statutory and common law rights of
70
publicity and California’s Unfair Competition Law. EA moved to
71
dismiss the claims, arguing that their use was transformative,
72
protected by the public interest exception, and the section 3344
73
public affairs exemption. While the court recognized the artistic
aspects of EA’s games, it noted that in order for a transformative use
defense to prevail, the transformation must be of the plaintiff’s image,
74
not other elements of the game. Because EA failed to demonstrate
any transformation of the players themselves, the court denied EA’s
75
use of the defense. The court also acknowledged a general public
interest in “products created for entertainment,” but distinguished
Keller from another similar case, C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing v.
Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir.

67. This case was consolidated with O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010
U.S. Dist LEXIS 19170 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2010), a case based on similar facts but instead
alleging anti-trust violations. See Complaint at 2.
68. Herb Adderley also brought suit on behalf of 2,056 retired players against the
NFL Players Association (“NFLPA”), alleging that NFLPA had failed to protect the
players’ interests in the context of video game marketing. Parrish v. Nat’l Football League
Players Inc., No. C 07-00943 WHA, 2009 WL 88484 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2009). The suit
was heard by a jury in the Northern District of California, who found for Adderley and
ordered NFLPA to pay $28.1 million in damages. See Judgment, Parrish, No. C 07-00943
WHA, 2009 WL 88484 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2009). Although NFLPA initially appealed the
decision, it has since settled with the players, agreeing to pay $ 26.2 million in damages.
See Order Granting Motion for Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement and
Proposed Plan of Distribution, Parrish, No. C 07-00943 WHA, 2009 WL 88484 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 13, 2009).
69. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2010). Keller also named the National Collegiate Athletics Association (“NCAA”) as a
defendant, alleging violations of his Indiana right of publicity, as well as civil conspiracy
and breach of contract. Id. at *7–8. The court dismissed the right of publicity and breach
of contract claims with leave to amend due to deficiencies in the pleadings. Id. at *11, *30.
The court did, however, find sufficient support for Keller’s civil conspiracy claim against
the NCAA. Id. at *27.
70. Id. at *8 (Keller also alleged several other violations that do not bear on this
discussion).
71. Id. at *12–13.
72. Id. at *18.
73. Id. at *22–23.
74. Id. at *18.
75. Id. at *16.
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76

2007). In C.B.C., the court upheld the unauthorized use of athletes’
personas on the grounds that the game at issue in C.B.C. relied on
real-time “recitation and discussion” of the players’ performance, a
77
factor not present in Keller. The court therefore also denied EA’s
78
public interest defense. Finally, the court determined that, in order
to qualify for the section 3344 public affairs exemption, EA’s use
would have to extend no further than reporting information about the
79
players. Because EA’s use extended far beyond those bounds, this
80
defense was also denied. The decision is currently on appeal before
the Ninth Circuit and all claims related to EA’s First Amendment
81
defense have been stayed.
Keller and Brown have since been assigned to the same Ninth
82
Circuit panel for consideration of the merits. A group of amici have
filed substantially identical amicus briefs on behalf of EA Sports in
83
both cases. The amicus brief opens with this telling statement: “It
would be difficult to invent two related cases that more starkly
illustrate the troubled state of the law concerning the relationship
between the right of the publicity, the Lanham Act, and the First
84
Amendment.”

76. Id. at *21.
77. Id. at *22.
78. Id.
79. Id. at *25.
80. Id.
81. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in part EA’s Motion to Stay, Denying
CLC’s and NCAA’s Motions to Stay, and Denying Without Prejudice Publicity-Rights
Plaintiffs’ Motion to De-Consolidate, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness
Litig., No. 09-1967, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139724 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2010) (Dec. 17,
2010). The case designation was changed to reflect that Keller had been consolidated with
several other student athlete claims.
82. See Order, Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 09-56675 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2009) (filed
Apr. 30, 2010) (granting Brown’s motion to assign his appeal and Keller’s appeal to the
same panel for consideration of the merits).
83. See Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief, Brown, No. 09-56676 (9th Cir. Oct.
23, 2009) (filed Sep. 27, 2010); see also Order Granting Leave to File Amicus Brief,
Brown, No. 09-56676 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2009) (filed Feb. 10, 2011) (indicating that amici
include, among others, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., Advance
Publications, A&E Television Networks, Comic Book Legal Defense Fund, ESPN, Namco
Bandai Games America, Konami Digital Entertainment, Take Two Interactive Software,
Viacom, and the Los Angeles Times).
84. See Prospective Amicus Brief at 1, Brown, No. 09-56676 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2009)
(filed Sep. 27, 2010).
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C. The Right to Privacy

The term “right to privacy” is imprecise, because this beguiling
expression has been used to designate many different rights of
varying importance, from the Fourth Amendment freedom from
arbitrary searches and seizures, to the right not to have one’s name
85
bruited about in gossip columns.
The “right not to have one’s name bruited about in gossip
columns” refers, of course, to the invasion of privacy torts mentioned
in the beginning of this section. These personal rights are, like the
right of publicity, of relatively recent origin. The famous article The
Right to Privacy, by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis was
86
the first place where it was described. The right was first codified by
the state of New York in 1903 in response to a case in which a young
woman was held to have no common law right to prevent a flour
company from using her picture in their advertisements without her
87
consent. The law was narrowly phrased and prohibited only the use
of an individual’s name or likeness, without the individual’s consent,
88
for advertising or trade purposes. Nowhere does the statute refer to
the “right not to have [one’s] feelings hurt” that Judge Frank referred
89
to in Haelan, or even the simple “right to be let alone” described by
90
Warren and Brandeis.
However, some courts have seen the right to privacy as a sort of
moral right in one’s image: Justice Greenbaum, in 1915, referred to
91
“rights for outraged feelings” and as recently as 1983, Judge Sofaer
noted that “New York’s Section 51 protects a person’s feelings and
right to be let alone . . . interests also protected in California, Illinois,
and Georgia. Relief is available under the applicable privacy law only
for acts that invade plaintiffs’ privacy and consequently bruise their
92
feelings.”

85. Cordell v. Detective Publ’n, Inc., 419 F.2d 989, 990 (6th Cir. 1969).
86. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
87. Samantha Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A Historical
Perspective, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 179 (2010). The case was Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447–48 (1902) and the law that it spawned
remains New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51.
88. Prosser, supra note 4, at 385–86.
89. See Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
90. Warren, supra note 86, at 205.
91. Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868, (citing Pekas Co., Inc. v. Leslie, 52 N.Y. L.J. 1864
(1915)).
92. Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (D.C.N.Y. 1983)
(citations omitted).
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Today the right to privacy is not typically seen in these terms, at
93
least when it is applied to celebrities. Celebrities, as public figures,
are expected to endure a certain amount of attention, including
94
negative attention. “Once the celebrity thrusts himself or herself
forward into the limelight, the First Amendment dictates that the
right to comment on, parody, lampoon, and make other expressive
95
The
uses of the celebrity image must be given broad scope.”
California Supreme Court in Saderup reasoned that, due to the strong
First Amendment protections granted to artistic expression, a
celebrity’s right of publicity was necessarily confined to an economic
96
right. However, other courts have found that celebrities do retain a
traditional right to privacy, although the level of invasion required to
97
support the claim may be higher than for non-celebrities.
It is
therefore possible for a celebrity to bring a traditional invasion of
privacy claim successfully, should she be able to present a persuasive
enough case while simultaneously avoiding a First Amendment
defense.
D. False Endorsement and Unfair Competition

At the federal level, both false endorsement and unfair
competition claims may be brought under the Lanham Act, the
98
federal statute governing trademark law. Because these claims are
grounded in trademark law, to show that the celebrity’s likeness is
protectable under trademark law, it is necessary to demonstrate that
the alleged action has caused the plaintiff some kind of economic
harm. Additionally, every state has an unfair competition statutory

93. “Consequently, the ‘severely circumscribed’ privacy interest of a public figure
does not permit an appropriation tort action for a wide category of types of publicizations
related to public figures’ public personalities . . .” DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS §
6:9 (updated June 2010) (internal citations omitted).
94. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (“Such criticism,
inevitably, will not always be reasoned or moderate; public figures as well as public
officials will be subject to ‘vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks[.]’) (internal citation omitted).
95. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., Cal. Rptr. 21 P.3d 797, 807 (Cal.
2001).
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
celebrity singer Tom Waits could rightfully recover for mental and emotional damage
caused by Frito-Lay’s unauthorized use of a Wait’s sound-a-like in a Dorito’s commercial;
Waits’ well-known refusal to commercially exploit his image in this manner was an
important factor in the court’s reasoning).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1112 (2006).
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regime, which may or may not include a section addressing false
endorsement.
1.

Federal False Endorsement and Unfair Competition Law

In order to prevail on a claim of false endorsement under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, the plaintiff must demonstrate that his or
her “name, symbol, or device” has been used in commerce in a way
that is likely to cause confusion in the mind of the consumer
99
regarding plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement of the product.
In addition to any claims under a state right of publicity, many
celebrities bring a claim under the false endorsement section of the
100
In some ways a federal trademark statute seems
Lanham Act.
unrelated to a right of privacy or publicity. However, the section
dealing with false endorsement includes elements similar to those in a
misappropriation claim; the primary difference is that a Lanham Act
101
false endorsement claim focuses on consumer confusion. A false
endorsement claim only applies, however, if the court finds that the
misuse is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive . . . as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her
102
goods.”
Some have suggested that a celebrity might choose to bring a
Lanham Act claim primarily to ensure that the case will be heard in
federal court, allowing enforcement of any judgment across state lines
and diminishing the variability that exists in the state right of publicity
103
This course of action, however, is not without potential
laws.
dangers, as will be discussed in Part III below.
2.

State Unfair Competition Laws
104

There are also state-based unfair competition laws
that
105
celebrities may seek to enforce in addition to the Lanham Act.
They do not, however, differ substantially from the terms of the

99. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
100. Id.
101. See Solomon, supra note 3, at 1206 (discussing why the Lanham Act is not a true
analog for a right of publicity).
102. Id. at 1206–07.
103. See, e.g., Lindsay Coleman, Virtual Confusion—How the Lanham Act Can Protect
Athletes from the Unauthorized Use of Their Likenesses in Sports Video Games, 1 AM. U.
INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 9, (2010).
104. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2011).
105. See, e.g., Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 610 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006).

2011]

ALL YOUR FACE ARE BELONG TO US

109

Lanham Act. The California Unfair Competition statute, for
example, prohibits “unfair competition . . . includ[ing] any unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive,
106
Like the Lanham Act, these
untrue or misleading advertising.”
107
Where a
state laws are designed to prevent harm to consumers.
celebrity’s image has been appropriated to create a false impression
of endorsement, an unfair competition claim may be an appropriate
108
addition to a right of publicity claim.
E. Copyright

Although copyright is one of the oldest forms of intellectual
property law, it extends only to creations that are “fixed in a tangible
109
medium.” Therefore, although a celebrity’s physical creation, such
as an autobiography, can be copyrighted, the celebrity’s persona
110
cannot. However, courts have sometimes looked to copyright law
when determining the contours of common law rights of publicity,
111
especially in the context of a fair use defense.

III. Application of the Legal Standards
One of the major problems facing would-be celebrity litigants is
that the application of both the right to privacy and the right of
publicity is highly variable depending on the state, and even the court,
in which the litigation is initiated. Some general rules, however, tend
to apply in the majority of the cases that courts have decided thus far.
A. Applying the Right of Publicity

Today, most courts see the right of publicity as a property right
112
Therefore, where a
intended to address commercial abuse.
celebrity is claiming a purely commercial harm, it can be a very useful

106. BUS. & PROF. § 17200 (West 2011) (this statute has been preempted in several
areas that are not relevant to this paper).
107. Rosal v. First Fed. Bank of Cal., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
108. See, e.g., Butkus v. Downtown Athletic Club of Orlando, Inc., No. CV 07-2507
PA (JWJX), 2008 WL 2557427 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2008).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
110. “A persona can hardly be said to constitute a ‘writing’ of an ‘author’ within the
meaning of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.” 1-1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
1.01[B][1][c] at 1-22 to 1-23, (footnotes omitted) (1999).
111. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., P.3d 797, 807–08 (Cal.
2001) (considering whether to incorporate the copyright fair use defense into the
California right of publicity).
112. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elec. Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
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113

tool.
It is not, however, without its downsides. First, the First
Amendment can trump its protection if a court finds the allegedly
114
offending work has significant expressive goals.
Moreover, if the
harm the celebrity suffers is one of personal outrage or moral offense,
rather than an economic harm, they do not have a claim under most
115
rights of publicity. This view is in accordance with the development
of the right of publicity as a property right, since the economic value
of a celebrity’s image is seen as her intellectual property under this
rationale. Therefore, a celebrity would probably be unable to bring a
valid right of publicity claim based on the use described at the
beginning of this paper were a court to find either that the offending
use (1) did not affect the celebrity’s ability to exploit her image
116
economically, or (2) was a protected expressive work.
However, the right of publicity is sometimes seen as deriving from
the right to privacy, which leaves open the possibility of twisting the
right of publicity to cover claims of personal offense. The statutes
that address the right of publicity typically specify the commercial
117
nature of the harm, but the common law is always somewhat open
to judicial reinterpretation.
This dual nature of the right of publicity may go a long way
towards explaining the inconsistency prevalent in that area of law.
The two rights, privacy and publicity, are similar in that they both
address the level of control that an individual may exert over image
and likeness. However, over the past fifty years, the two rights have
diverged in a number of dramatic ways, and each has continued to
develop independently, sometimes in ways that have arguably been
118
detrimental to the core rights they were intended to protect.
Due to this inconsistency, attempting to use either or both of
these rights to create a celebrity claim based on misuse of persona
with noneconomic damages seems unwise. While it might be
workable, further twisting an area of the law already fraught with
such problems is inviting chaos. Additionally, since these are both

113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
114. See, e.g., Winter v. D.C. Comics, P.3d 473, 476 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
115. 63C AM. JUR. 2D PROPERTY § 6 (2d ed. 2011).
116. See, e.g., White, 971 F.2d at 1398; see also Winter, P.3d 473 at 478.
117. E.g. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2011).
118. See, e.g., Arrington v. New York Times, 55 N.Y.2d. 433 (1982) (holding that the
New York Times’ right to freedom of expression trumped Arrington’s right not to have his
photograph displayed on the cover page accompanying a story with which he violently
disagreed).

2011]

ALL YOUR FACE ARE BELONG TO US

111

state or common law-based rights, such an adjustment would likely
vary from state to state and would not exist everywhere.
B. Applying the Right to Privacy

The more suitable claim, when the asserted injury is more of a
119
personal affront, is the right to privacy. Tort law provides a number
of invasion of privacy torts that could be claimed in this situation,
120
such as false light, or misappropriation of image.
There is one
serious bar to applying this right to the situations under discussion:
Even where a court might consider whether feelings of outrage are
sufficient to constitute a claim of action, celebrities are not likely to
121
be included in that protection due to their public stature.
Therefore, although the right to privacy is the most applicable
doctrine in a situation where the celebrity’s complaint relates not to
economic injury, but rather to distasteful or offensive material, the
122
public status of a celebrity is likely to bar its use.
C. Applying the Lanham Act

The goal of trademark law is to prevent consumer confusion and
123
Protection of an
protect a company’s investment in its marks.
individual’s image does not fit into either of these categories unless
124
the image can somehow be claimed as a mark.
However, a more
recent addition to trademark law is the false endorsement section of
125
This section does not specifically mention
the Lanham Act.
celebrities but courts consistently find that it “permits celebrities to
vindicate property rights in their identities against allegedly
126
misleading commercial use by others.”
The key phrase here is “misleading commercial use.” Trademark
127
law is, as a whole, solidly grounded in commercial use. Even more
clearly than with the right of publicity, a claim made by a celebrity
that fails to assert economic damage will not succeed under a Lanham

119. See Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198 (D.C.N.Y.
1983) (discussing this aspect of privacy law in a celebrity suit).
120. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
121. See Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 175,
188 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt (e) (1977).
122. See Bi-Rite Enters, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (D.C.N.Y. 1983).
123. MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 2.2 (4th ed. 2007).
124. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829, 831–32 (2000).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1) (2006).
126. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 459 (6th Cir. 2003).
127. Id.
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Act claim. Therefore, just as a celebrity would be unable to proceed
with her claim under the right of publicity if she were found not to be
economically damaged by Rock Star’s use, so too would a Lanham
Act claim be barred if the game publisher’s use were found to be
noncommercial, or if a court found it unlikely that a consumer would
mistakenly believe that the use indicated the celebrity’s endorsement.
Additionally, the First Amendment can provide a complete
128
defense to Lanham Act false endorsement claims. Video games are
considered expressive works, entitled to the full protection of the
129
First Amendment. Even though video game publishers clearly hope
to profit from the sales of their games, an ultimate goal of profit does
130
not preclude categorization as noncommercial use. Moreover, a use
that is morally antithetical to the offended celebrity is actually less
likely to be prohibited under the Lanham Act than a neutral one
would be, since the greater the distance between the purported
infringing work and the celebrity persona, the lower the chance of
consumer confusion and, ultimately, the stronger the First
Amendment claim.
The recent ruling in Jim Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., indicates
that such a claim by other similarly situated celebrities may not prove
131
In Brown, the California district court held that Brown’s
fruitful.
“mere presence in MaddenNFL d[id] not constitute an explicit
attempt to convince consumers the [sic] Brown endorsed the
132
However, Brown is currently on appeal to the Ninth
games.”
Circuit so the final outcome remains uncertain. The question of
whether Brown’s presence in MaddenNFL is an important one; many
133
eyes will be on the Ninth Circuit as it considers this appeal. EA’s
use of Brown’s persona seems difficult to deny; however, the fact that
Brown’s image does not appear on any promotional material seems

128. E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir.
2008).
129. See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), citing
Interactive Digital Software v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 956–58 (8th Cir. 2003).
130. See, e.g., Mattel v. MCA, 296 F.3d 894, 905–06 (9th Cir. 2002).
131. Brown v. Elec. Arts, No. 2:09-cv-01598-FMC-RZx (C.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2009),
appeal docketed, No. 09-56675 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2009).
132. Id.
133. One of the distinctions the district court made was between the use of a celebrity
image in promotional material and use within the game, reasoning that while the former
might well be seen as indicating endorsement, the latter did not. On appeal, Brown has
argued that this decision was improper because it relied on findings of fact not supported
by Brown’s complaint. Brief for Appellant at 16, Brown v. Elec. Arts., No. 09-56675, (9th
Cir. July 6, 2010).
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likely to undermine his Lanham Act claims, meaning that the Ninth
Circuit may, like the district court, decline to hear the state court
claims.
The Lanham Act is, at its heart, a trademark statute with the
134
primary goal of preventing consumer confusion.
The Act’s false
endorsement section aligns neatly with that goal; using that section to
135
protect either a moral or economic right to one’s image does not.
Although some celebrities have managed to prevail on Lanham Act
claims in cases that more clearly resembled violations of a right of
136
publicity than false endorsement, relying on the Lanham Act to
137
provide federal right of publicity protection remains unwise. Many
other celebrities have not prevailed on their Lanham Act claims; in
Jim Brown’s case, his misguided reliance on a Lanham Act claim
138
prevented his state law claims from being heard in federal court.
Moreover, as the ability of celebrities to bring Lanham Act false
endorsement claims to obtain federal right of publicity protection
supports the argument that there is no need for an actual federal right
139
of publicity statute.
D. The Impact of New Technology on a Right to Publicity

If the legal standards governing noncommercial misappropriation
of celebrity images is confusing today, the situation will likely worsen
as new technology leaps ahead of the law. Already companies are
able to “re-animate” deceased celebrities and place their images into
140
movies and commercials.
While this phenomenon has not yet
gained popularity in the United States, it is widespread in some

134. Solomon, supra note 3, at 1206.
135. See id. at 1206–07.
136. See, e.g., Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) (holding
that the use of a Woody Allen look-a-like violated the Lanham Act by potentially
misleading consumers into the belief that Woody Allen endorsed the product).
137. This is particularly true given concerns that trademark law, like other growing
fields of intellectual property, has been forced to accommodate a growing array of rights
that do not align with the core goals of trademark law. See generally Mark A. Lemley, The
Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999).
138. See Brown v. Elec. Arts, No. 2:09-cv-01598-FMC-RZx (C.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2009),
appeal docketed, No. 09-56675 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2009).
139. See Solomon, supra note 3, at 1211–12.
140. Stuart Klawans, Ideas & Trends: Dead Stars, Alive Again; Yes, Marilyn May Fall
in Love With Viggo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, available at http://query.nytimes.com/
gst/fullpage.html?res=9D04E7D71E3DF932A3575BC0A9629C8B63.
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141

countries, such as Korea.
Similarly, video game developers have
begun to incorporate celebrity images into games, both with celebrity
142
authorization and without.
Given the popularity of playing these
real-life characters, the practice seems unlikely to disappear any time
soon.
In the past, if a third party misappropriated a celebrity’s image,
the worst damage that the celebrity was likely to suffer was the
appearance of the image in an advertisement that its owner found
143
objectionable. Regardless of the context of the use, the image was
simply that—a still image. Today, far more is possible. The
advancement of highly realistic imagery in video games means that
developers can now place a celebrity’s image in the midst of a realistic
world where third parties control his or her actions. The level of
potential invasion is therefore substantially higher and calls for a
144
stricter protection regime.

141. See, e.g., Hyung Doo Nam, The Emergence of Hollywood Ghosts on Korean TVs:
The Right of Publicity from the Global Market Perspective, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 487
(2010).
142. The MaddenNFL franchise is only one such example. NBAJam, also by EA
Sports, has included a celebrity player feature since it’s earliest incarnation in 1993; the
new version for the Wii allows fans to unlock teams that include the Beastie Boys,
numerous historic basketball favorites, President Barack Obama, Joe Biden, Bill and
Hillary Clinton, Al Gore, George W. Bush, Sarah Palin, John McCain, and Dick Cheney.
ESPN interview by Jon Robinson with Trey Smith, creative director of NBA Jam (Oct. 5,
2010) available at http://espn.go.com/espn/thelife/videogames/blog/_/name/thegamer/id
/5650055/palin-obama-star-nba-jam?readmore=fullstory. During the interview, Robinson
asked Smith how EA had received permission from the various politicians, to which Smith
answered simply, “I have no idea.”
143. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that Los Angeles Magazine’s publication of an altered photograph, based on the
famous ‘Tootsie’ poster featuring Hoffman in a red evening gown, of Hoffman’s head
from the original picture on the body of a male model dressed in an evening gown and
heels was protected noncommercial speech).
144. The band No Doubt has a pending suit against Activision on very similar grounds.
Gwen Stefani (the band’s well-known lead singer) and other band members allege that
they agreed to appear in Activision’s Band Hero video game in a limited way. The band
claims that their images were then used beyond the bounds set in their contract with
Activision. Stefani specifically claims injury based on Activision allowing game players to
use Stefani’s character to perform songs that Stefani finds personally offensive, including
the Rolling Stones’ “Honky Tonk Woman.” The suit is currently pending before the Los
Angeles Superior Court. No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g Inc., No. CV 09-8872 SVW
(VBKx). It seems clear from the band’s complaint, however, that the interactive aspect of
the game, which allowed players to control band members’ images, was part of what made
the alleged invasion of privacy that much more offensive to the plaintiffs. See Alex
Dobuzinskis, Rockers Sue Activision Over Band Hero, REUTER,(Nov. 4, 2009. 7:00pm,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5A400320091105); see also No Doubt v.
Activision, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
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Video game developers often use real-life images as the basis for
145
the art they produce for video games. The artistic aspect of video
games provides the artists a high level of First Amendment
protection, often allowing game designers to overcome both
146
trademark and right of publicity claims. At the same time, both the
right of publicity and right to privacy have been invoked in the past to
prevent unauthorized uses of celebrity images when those images
cause economic injury or extreme offense, respectively. The question
becomes: where do First Amendment protections end, and celebrity
rights begin? This paper suggests that the increased realism of video
games necessitates the drawing of a more precise line, especially
when there is no economic injury. Allowing this area of law to
remain unsettled places game designers in a position of uncertainty
with regard to whether their creations, which are costly and labor
intensive, will be protected, and celebrities in a position of
uncertainty with regard to which uses they may legitimately prevent.
This will lead to increased litigation, and could have a chilling effect
on the development of the gaming industry. The results in Brown
and Keller, as discussed in Part II above, demonstrate the need for a
clear standard in this area; Part IV of this paper will suggest ways this
could be achieved. Whichever approach is ultimately selected,
however, it seems clear that clarification and increased consistency
147
are needed.

IV. Alternative Approaches
Part of the difficulty with finding a way to protect a celebrity’s
right to her image apart from any economic considerations is that
American jurisprudence has generally opted to put less emphasis on
moral rights than on economic ones, especially in the realm of

145. See E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th
Cir. 2008).
146. See Brown v. Elec. Arts, No. 2:09-cv-01598-FMC-RZx (C.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2009),
appeal docketed, No. 09-56675 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2009) (discussed above, holding that EA’s
alleged violation of the Lanham Act was protected by the First Amendment); see also
Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 614–16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that
the use that allegedly violated Kirby’s right of publicity was transformative enough to
merit First Amendment protection).
147. But cf. Oliver A. Khan, Me, Myself, and My Avatar: The Right to the Likeness of
Our Digital Selves, 5 ISJLP 447 (2010) (discussing whether players have a right of publicity
in avatars, or character images, designed to represent themselves. While Khan indicates
that they probably do not have such a right at this time, he also suggests that this may
change as video games become more photorealistic).
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148

intellectual property.
One reason for this could be that the First
Amendment right to free expression is seen as a basic, inalienable
right. Because the Constitution explicitly protects the right to free
expression, any action seen as censorship tends to be subject to strict
scrutiny. Alternately, it could simply be that economic rights are
easier to delineate and enforce, which improves consistent
enforceability. Whatever the reason, between the limited availability
of a right of privacy action for celebrities and the primarily
commercial focus of the right of publicity and false endorsement laws,
celebrities are seemingly left with no reliable way to challenge use of
their images that they find personally objectionable, short of a
149
defamation or false light claim.
Parts II and III of this paper attempted to provide an accurate
description of the general state of affairs in this area of the law. In
light of that description, it appears that celebrities who have suffered
a noncommercial harm, especially one that may not rise to the level
of outrage sometimes required in invasion of privacy cases, may have
a difficult time identifying the appropriate course of action. One
proposed solution is the adoption of a moral rights scheme similar to
150
those common in Europe. While this solution does have a certain
appeal, it also has serious flaws that make its adoption in America
seem unlikely. A more plausible solution is the adoption of a more
clearly defined federal right of publicity. These two options will both
be discussed in great detail in the following sections.
A. Incorporating Moral Rights into the American System
1.

Moral Rights in Europe

In European copyright law, “moral rights” refer to the rights of a
creator (1) to receive (or deny) attribution for her works; (2) to
prevent unauthorized alteration of her work; and (3) to withdraw or

148. For an interesting discussion of why this might be in the context of copyright law,
see Joan Pattarozzi, Can the Australian Model Be Applied to U.S. Moral Rights
Legislation?, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423 (2007).
149. Although defamation and false light look like appealing alternatives at first blush,
they are prone to many of the same weaknesses as the rights discussed above; they are
based in state law, they have numerous specific elements that can be difficult to prove, and
they are generally more difficult for celebrities to invoke. Moreover, they don’t tend to be
used as often (perhaps for those reasons) so this paper has not addressed them in depth.
150. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational
Interests of Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First
Century, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 152 (2001).
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151

correct her work.
The second right, often called the right to
integrity, has been interpreted as including the right to prevent
another from destroying the work, displaying a distorted version of
the work, performing the work without following the creator’s
152
instruction for doing so, or displaying the work out of context. It is
important to note that these rights continue after the work has been
sold, are inalienable, and depending on the circumstances, may be
153
unwaivable.
France provides the most extensive protection with its Code de la
154
Propriété Intellectuelle Arts (“I.P. Code”). The code protects not
only authors, painters, and other traditional “artists” but also
performers in general, providing them with inalienable rights to
exercise some level of control over their creations and to protect their
155
reputations. This is contrary to some of the other codes that extend
only to more traditional fields; for example, the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works extends similar rights
156
There has, however, been a movement
but only to “authors.”
throughout Europe and some of the common law countries during the
last fifty years or so to provide broader protection to performers,
including protection for a performer’s “reputational and personality
157
rights.”

151. Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV.
1, 12 (1997). For an explanation of how these right typically function, see Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38
VAND. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (1985).
152. Cotter, supra note 151, at 13–14 (internal citations omitted). Each example in this
list comes from an actual case brought in France or Germany.
153. Cotter, supra note 151, at 12.
154. See Kwall, supra note 151 at 12.
155. CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE art. L. 212-2: “A performer shall
have the right to respect for his name, his capacity and his performance. This inalienable
and imprescriptible right shall attach to his person. It may be transmitted to his heirs in
order to protect his performance and his memory after his death.” This right extends to
“persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, play in or otherwise perform literary or artistic
works, variety, circus or puppet acts.” Id. at art. L. 212-1.
156. Berne Convention for the Protection Literary and Artistic Works art. 6bis, July
24, 1971828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention] “The Berne Convention was
signed in 1886 and is the oldest multilateral treaty governing copyright protection. Article
6bis of the Berne Convention addresses moral rights of authors, but does not cover
performers.” Kwall, supra note 150 at 156, n.35.
157. Kwall, supra note 151 at 155–56.

118

2.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[34:1

Moral Rights in America

The United States has generally declined to create a specific
158
“moral right” for artists.
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(“VARA”) creates something akin to a moral right but it only
159
extends, as the name suggests, to visual artists. The United States is
also a signatory to the Berne Convention, which includes a moral
160
rights clause.
However, when the United States signed the Berne
Convention in 1988, it did so with the understanding that the moral
rights clause would not apply. The argument was that the treaty is
not self-executing, and because the United States already protects
those same rights with all of the protections discussed above, the
161
moral rights clause is unnecessary. Therefore, American artists in
nonvisual arts fields have had to continue to rely on the patchwork of
privacy, publicity, unfair competition, and tort law described above.
While there are legitimate First Amendment concerns when
considering a system of inalienable moral rights such as the one in
France, there are also serious concerns with the United States’
unwillingness to join the rest of the Western world in extending some
162
kind of coherent, universal protection to artists.
Commentators have been discussing the possibility of
incorporating moral rights into the United States’ intellectual
163
This raises several problems,
property landscape for decades.
however. First, haphazard as the laws of privacy, publicity, and unfair
competition are, they have existed long enough to become a settled
part of the system. Changing settled laws creates uncertainty. This
danger only increases when the change in law would occur by way of
importing a civil law concept with the potential to run headlong into
First Amendment issues. Moreover, the United States has always
favored free alienability, which the French moral rights system
prohibits, and the freedom to contract, which the French system limits

158.
159.
160.
161.

Geisel v. Poynter Prods, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 340 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
17 U.S.C. § 101.
Berne Convention, supra note 156.
See Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar “Gap,” 2007
UTAH L. REV. 659, 665–66 (2007).
162. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Driscoll, It’s a Small World After All—Conflict of Laws and
Copyright Infringement on the Information Superhighway, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 939
(1999).
163. See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 151; Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A
Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1,
15 (1988); Adolf Dietz, Alai Congress: ANTWERP 1993, The Moral Right of the Author:
Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 199, 212 (1995).
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in a number of ways. Why, then, should we even consider such a
system?
Mark McKenna, an assistant professor at the Saint Louis
University School of Law, posited an interesting theory in his article
164
The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition. Professor
McKenna’s premise is that everyone, whether famous or not, has an
165
inherent interest in his or her public image that deserves protection.
He describes the potential damage of a situation involving the
appropriation of a celebrity’s image in a non-commercial but
personally offensive way as causing “destabilization of meaning”
because it tends to create new associations in the minds of viewers,
166
regardless of confusion over endorsement.
While Professor McKenna does not describe his proposal in terms
of moral rights, what he is advocating could be described in such
terms, given that the protection he suggests is for an individual’s right
of self-definition. Alice Haemmerli, former dean at Columbia Law
School, made a similar argument in support of a proposed
amendment to the Lanham Act that would have functioned as a
167
federal right of publicity. In contrast, Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, a
professor at the DePaul College of Law, proposes incorporating
168
In
European moral rights into the American copyright system.
Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of Constructed
Personas Through Moral Rights, Kwall makes a two-fold argument:
first, she argues that a celebrity persona is a creative work protectable
by copyright law, and second, she proposes that the United States
169
implement European-style moral rights at a federal level. She notes
at least six countries have already enacted provisions that specifically

164. Mark McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U.
PITT. L. REV. 225 (2005–2006).
165. Id. at 279–80.
166. “This destabilization might result from third-party uses that offer inconsistent or
negative interpretations of an identity.” Id. at 288.
167. See Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49
DUKE L.J. 383, 410 (1999).
168. Kwall, supra note 150 at 159; see also Kwall, supra note 151.
169. Kwall, supra note 150, at 159–60, 165–66. Kwall also suggests that celebrity
personas should be protectable under the current copyright scheme, although that is not
currently the case: “Additionally, federal moral-rights protection is necessary to protect
the reputational and personality interests of performers and others whose personas are
subject to mutilation through misappropriation. Unfortunately, in the United States,
conventional moral-rights and copyright doctrines have ignored the reality that
constructed personas are works of authorship, and therefore eligible for protection under
federal copyright law.” Id. at 154.
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170

protect the public personas of celebrities and points to a number of
171
One of the
international conventions that have done the same.
primary reasons she believes this change is necessary is the state of
172
confusion described above.
Ultimately, the problem with attempting to incorporate moral
rights into the American system, whether through the Lanham Act,
copyright law, or independently, is that any discussion of a moral
rights system will inevitably invite comparisons with the European
system. The danger of the comparison is that when one looks at the
European system, it quickly becomes apparent that many aspects of
those systems are fundamentally incompatible with the First
173
Amendment.
B. Federal Right of Publicity Legislation

Although adopting a European-style moral rights scheme would
pose serious difficulties, this does not mean that creating a modified
moral right, with appropriate limitations, is not feasible. Though
Congress has considered proposals for a federal right of publicity in

170. See id. at 155, n.31: Dr. Adolf Dietz, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
LAW AND PRACTICE GER-1, § 9 (Paul Edward Geller et al. eds., 1999) (“One moral right
is recognized in Section 83, which entitles the performer to prohibit such distortion or
other alteration of his performance as might prejudice his prestige or reputation . . ..”); Dr.
Mario Fabiani, Italy, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE ITA-1, §
9[1][a][i] (Paul Edward Geller et al. eds., 1999) (“Article 81 of the Act affords to
performers the moral right to relief from such dissemination, transmission, or
reproduction of their performances as would be prejudicial to their honor or reputation.”);
Dr. Gunnar Karnell, Sweden, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE
SWE-1, § 9[1][a][i] (Paul Edward Geller et al. eds., 1999) (“Performers have the same
moral rights as authors.”); Andre Lucas, France, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
AND PRACTICE FRA-1, § 9[1][a][i] (Paul Edward Geller et al. eds., 1999) (“A performing
artist has rights to respect for his name and status . . . and to respect for his interpretation,
that is, for its integrity.”); Alain Strowel & Jan Corbet, Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE BEL-1, § 9[1] [[a][i] (Paul Edward Geller et al. eds., 1999)
(“The 1994 Copyright Act grants artistic performers . . . [t]he right of integrity, like that in
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, is predicated on showing prejudice to honor or
reputation.”); Joshua Weisman, Israel, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE ISR-1, § 9[1][a] (Paul Edward Geller et al. eds., 1999) (“Performers have moral
rights like those of authors, except that they are protected only against modifications of a
derogatory nature . . .”).
171. Id. at 156.
172. Id. at 159–60.
173. See Lawrence Adam Beyer, Intentionalism, Art, and the Suppression of
Innovation: Film Colorization and the Philosophy of Moral Rights, 82 NW. U. L. REV.
1011, 1055 (1988) (arguing that the moral rights movement is in reality an attempt to
“impose through the law their views on public immaturity, ignorance, or psychological
enslavement.”).
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174

the past, it has yet to approve onr. One of the problems inherent in
these proposals has been the attempt to graft the right of publicity on
175
to a pre-existing statute, most often the Lanham Act. The Lanham
Act, however, already provides sufficient protection for celebrities
176
The
that are concerned with a false impression of endorsement.
protections that are missing are: (1) consistent protection for
commercial misuse that does not qualify as false endorsement, and
(2) for significant moral offense, whether commercial or not.
Attempts to wedge a right of publicity that would address both of
these issues into a well-defined framework designed to reach a wholly
separate issue is unwise and likely to cause more problems than it
would resolve. A new statute delineating which rights deserve
protection while simultaneously providing adequate First
Amendment protections would serve both celebrities and the judicial
system far more effectively.

V. Conclusion
Judges and legislators have worked to find a way to balance
privacy rights with free speech rights for the last hundred years.
While their intentions were good, and some useful laws have been
passed, the result is a mishmash of laws, state and federal, that
overlap in some areas, neglect other areas, and leave individuals
uncertain as to what exactly their protections are. This uncertainty is
amplified in the case of public figures who have often been excluded
from many of the privacy protections, yet granted expanded publicity
rights. Until recently, it could be argued that, confusing as the system
was, when combined with the ability to contract freely, it was
adequate. This is no longer the case. The potential for significant
noncommercial violations has increased exponentially with advances
in technology, while the protection granted has remained in a state of
flux. Moreover, increasing globalization makes the United States’
unwillingness to comply with other Western nations all the more
glaring. Finally, very few major companies operate in a single state
anymore, making the state by state nature of the current protections
even more problematic.

174. See Marci A. Hamilton et al., Rights of Publicity: An In-Depth Analysis of the
New Legislative Proposals to Congress, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 209 (1998).
175. Eric J. Goodman, A National Identity Crisis: The Need for a Federal Right of
Publicity Statute, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 227, 247–50 (1999).
176. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992).

122

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[34:1

It could be argued that any action taken now would be premature,
given that no one has actually abused the uncertainty in the law in the
way described at the opening of this paper. No actor or actress has
challenged any improper use of her face in Grand Theft Auto nor
does such action seem imminent. Or does it? The Brown and Keller
cases are on appeal to the Ninth Circuit right now and, while they do
not involve either player’s face being put in any kind of compromising
position, they do involve allegations of the wholesale use of celebrity
personas without permission. No Doubt’s pending lawsuit against
Activision is premised largely on the band members’ personal distaste
for the scenarios in which developers placed their images in the video
177
And in 2010, one of the backup singers in
game “Band Hero.”
Cypress Hill, Michael “Shagg” Washington, filed suit against
Rockstar, alleging that they used his persona as the basis for the
character of C.J., the lead character in Grand Theft Auto: San
178
Andreas. So perhaps the hypothetical raised here is not as distant as
179
While it is certainly possible (and perhaps
one might be hope.
necessary, in the case of judicial action) to wait to take action until a
game developer actually oversteps the boundaries of decency, it is
also possible for Congress to take preemptive action to clarify this
issue before it becomes even more of a morass.
A. The Need for a Federal Right of Publicity Statute

The need for a federal right of publicity statute is increasingly
clear, given the plethora of related lawsuits brought in the context of
video games in recent years. The traditional tort laws may have been
sufficient in the days of print media (though that statement itself is
certainly open to debate) but they are no longer adequate today, as

177. See No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit panel recently requested that the plaintiffs in Brown v. EA
and Keller v. EA submit supplemental briefs discussing how the California Court of
Appeals’ recent ruling in No Doubt v. Activision, affirming the trial court’s denial of
Activision’s transformative use argument, might affect the appeal. Order, Brown v. Elec.
Arts, Case No. 09-56675, (filed Feb.18, 2011).
178. Complaint at 1, Washington v. Rockstar Games, Inc., No. BC 450602 (Complaint)
(Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles, filed Dec. 6, 2010); see also Drew Boortz, Developing
Concerns: Legal Developments Pertaining To and Affecting the Video Game Industry,
Grand Theft Copyright? Rockstar and Take-Two Sued for $250 Million (Dec. 10, 2010)
http://www.developingconcerns.com/2010/12/articles/intellectual-property-1/grand-theftcopyright-rockstar-and-taketwo-sued-for-250-million/.
179. See Richard Masur, Right of Publicity from the Performer’s Point of View, 10
DePaul-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 253, 258 (2000) (“As technology develops,
enabling more and more thefts of both still and moving images to occur, a mechanism for
curtailing this type of abuse becomes increasingly necessary.”).
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can be witnessed by the bewildering array of allegations made in
many of these cases. What is critical is that Congress not attempt to
graft yet another side law onto preexisting intellectual property law.
It is time for the legal world to recognize that privacy law, while
connected to intellectual property, is not merely a subset of
trademark or copyright law. Any attempt to fit a federal right of
publicity into an existing scheme will serve only to muddy the laws
further. Instead, Congress must draft a new statute that delineates
precisely which rights a famous individual has with regard to the use
of her name, image, voice, and persona. Additionally, Congress must
articulate which First Amendment protections are available to
creators.
B. Suggested Parameters of a Federal Right of Publicity Law

One possible model for a federal right of publicity is the
180
The TDRA was
Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA”).
designed to protect only the most famous marks, providing those
marks with protection against tarnishing or offensive uses that would
otherwise be permitted, regardless of whether the damage is
181
pecuniary or not.
Private citizens are already protected against
public misappropriation of their images by the traditional invasion of
privacy torts. Congress could provide celebrities with protection
against technological misappropriations without significantly
hindering free expression by providing a separate right of publicity
against unauthorized commercial and noncommercial use to those
celebrities that establish the requisite level of fame.
Under the TDRA, before a mark qualifies for protection, the
182
mark holder must demonstrate that the mark is famous. The statute
provides a nonexhaustive list of evidence through which a mark
holder may provide that proof, including the distinctiveness of the
mark, the duration and extent of use, the duration and extent of
related advertising, the geographical extent of use, the channels of
trade in which the mark is used, the degree of recognition of the mark

180. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). The TDRA also protects against “diluting uses,” or
those that lessen the mark’s power to serve as a distinctive identifier. However, that
application does not appear appropriate in the celebrity image context and will not be
addressed in this paper.
181. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12 (2005) (statement of Ann Gundelfinger).
182. See Louis Vittone Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 264–
65 (4th Cir. 2007).

124

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

[34:1

in those channels, whether other third parties use the same or similar
marks and if so to what extent, and the nature of the mark’s
183
registration. With reasonable alterations, this list could be adjusted
for use in the celebrity arena: a celebrity could provide proof of her
widespread appearance in media, the distinctiveness of her name,
persona, or other protectable asset, the length of time during which
she has publicized the protectable asset, and the venues in which she
uses the protectable asset.
One problem that courts have encountered in applying the
TDRA is determining what level of fame must be present before a
184
Therefore, Congress must
mark qualifies for TDRA protections.
include clearer instructions in the federal right of publicity statute,
that inform celebrities and courts alike of which celebrities will be
permitted to claim this protection. One possible way to achieve this
would be to require celebrities to provide evidence of at least three of
the factors of fame, or to demonstrate recognition by the public in the
specified region, at or above the level of a certain percent.
The TDRA also includes a section that outlines the First
Amendment protections available to creators. The last thing that a
reasonable celebrity wants is for the entertainment world to lose the
ability to parody or comment on people. Instead, the statute should
prohibit only uses that take someone’s image or persona and insert it
into a work without any meaningful purpose, along the lines of the
185
An intent to parody or comment must
traditional Rogers test.
qualify as protected expression, as should artistic expression. For
example, federal right of publicity shoud clearly protect a use such as
Addicting Games’ depiction of former Vice President Cheney in
Cheney’s Fury (in which the player takes on the role of former Vice
President Cheney and attempts to shoot other political figures while
hunting) since the game is a timely parody of Cheney’s hunting
186
incident.
In contrast, the federal right should not protect the

183. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
184. Compare Board of Regents v. KST Electric, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 657, 679 (W.D.
Tex. 2008) (finding that the Texas Longhorn mascot was not sufficiently famous to merit
protection under the TRDA) with Univ. of Kansas v. Sinks, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1258 (D.
Kan. 2008) (finding that the Kansas Jayhawk mascot was sufficiently famous to overcome
a motion for summary judgment).
185. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). The Rogers test asks
whether the allegedly infringing use has any artistic relevance and, if so, whether the use is
likely to be misleading. Id. The claims in Rogers were based in both the Lanham Act’s
false endorsement provision and state law right of publicity and defamation claims.
186. Cheny’s Fury, Addicting Games, http://www.addictinggames.com/life-style-games/
chenygame.jsp (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
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hypothetical game featuring a known actress, unless the game
producers could demonstrate that they had some kind of legitimate
comment to make regarding that celebrity.
The unfortunate reality of such a distinction is that it will still
require difficult line drawing. However, even such a test as that,
based on federal legislation, would be preferable to the muddle that
exists at present. It might be possible, also, for Congress to
incorporate aspects of the state laws that have proved most effective
and thus craft a workable federal statute.
C. Whether Moral Rights Should Be Addressed in the Federal Right of
Publicity Statute

Professor McKenna’s suggestion of a single right of self-definition
statute that would apply to all individuals, regardless of fame, is an
interesting possibility but may prove too close to traditional moral
rights law for comfort. Reopening the discussion of the possibility of
incorporating more of a moral rights scheme into U.S. law could
eventually prove fruitful, however. The question is not whether the
United States should follow in the footsteps of France—that would be
impractical, given the countries’ different histories and values, and it
would be unnecessary. However, a vast area exists to be explored
between the current lack of moral rights in most areas in the United
States and the expansive protections granted in France. The passage
of the VARA indicates that there is some level of willingness to
create moral rights in the United States. The questions that remain
are: (1) Which rights deserve such protection, and (2) How can that
protection best be extended? Optimally, a federal right of publicity
statute would include a moral rights provision for artists and
performers in such a way as to balance them with First Amendment
rights at the outset.
The critical goal, in the end, is for Congress to recognize this
problem before it grows too large to contain. If performers begin to
feel too threatened, it’s entirely possible that they will relocate. The
fact that California has both the most expansive protections for
performers and the largest population of performers is no accident;
there is no reason the next move could not be to Europe. Rather
than continue in a system that simply encourages performers to file
suit in advantageous states (thus overwhelming those systems) and
tack on every possible claim in the hopes that one will stick, the
legislature must work towards implementing a new rule that is
coherent, consistent, and practical. Only in doing so, can the law
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provide the stability and enforceability that are the hallmarks of any
good legal plan.

